An alternative solution mainly uses security clauses to specify the security requirements. These clauses ensure that foreign contractors or subcontractors safeguard Canadian protected information according to similar standards as Canadian suppliers on various aspects, such as:. Security clauses also cover compliance visits, security breaches and the measures to be taken in case of loss or compromise of Protected A or Protected B assets and information exchanged under a contract or subcontract.
Inform your Government of Canada procurement officer of your intent to bid on a solicitation request or subcontract involving Protected A or Protected B that require foreign resources. The officer will contact Public Services and Procurement Canada's Contract Security Program to confirm the possibility to use international alternative solutions. When a Canadian organization has informed you of its intent to bid on a solicitation request or subcontract involving Protected A or Protected B that require foreign resources, inform Public Services and Procurement Canada's Contract Security Program at ssicontratsinternationaux.
The program will confirm the possibility to use international alternative solutions. If solutions are possible, it will then validate the security requirements in the solicitation request, contract or subcontract to ensure the organization is in compliance with the security requirements. Inform the appropriate Government of Canada procurement officer of your intent to bid on a Canadian solicitation request or subcontract. The procurement officer will contact Public Services and Procurement Canada's Contract Security Program to validate the security requirements.
Depending on the specifics of the solicitation request or subcontract, you must demonstrate to Public Services and Procurement Canada that you meet the security requirements of the solicitation request or subcontract in your bid submission. PSPC negotiates international bilateral security instruments with foreign countries and international organizations. These instruments promote trade and economic growth and facilitate Canadian industry's participation in foreign contracts requiring access to classified information and assets.
Security-cleared individuals are required to get approval to visit an organization both at home and abroad in order to discuss or access classified information. A request for visit RFV should be made at least 1 to 2 months before the visit to avoid delays. PSPC works with our international counterparts to approve visits to government or contractor sites outside of Canada.
For visits from foreign countries to Canada, foreign organizations must complete and submit a RFV form to their own country's security authority. Foreign organizations wanting to bid on Government of Canada GC contracts with security requirements must contact their designated security authority , which is the government organization responsible for contract security, in their home country.
Customized alternative solutions, based on international best practices, could ensure the safeguarding of protected information handled abroad for the purposes of GC contracting where there is no bilateral security instrument covering protected information.
An alternative solution uses security clauses to ensure that foreign contractors, including subcontractors, safeguard Canadian protected information according to similar standards as Canadian suppliers. Bbuzz: A Bit-aware Fuzzing Framework for Network Protocol Systematic Reverse Engineering and Analysis Fuzzing is a critical part of secure software development life-cycle, for finding vulnerabilities, developing exploits, and reverse engineering.
This relies Authors: Bernhards Blumbergs Risto Vaarandi. Frankenstack: Toward Real-time Red Team Feedback Cyber Defense Exercises have received much attention in recent years, and are increasingly becoming the cornerstone for ensuring readiness in Focus Area: Operations Technology. The Czech Republic: A Case of a Comprehensive Approach toward Cyberspace The Czech authorities made the first steps towards a safer cyberspace on the national level a couple of years ago, Authors: Anna-Maria Osula M.
Authors: Deborah Housen-Couriel. Ethics and Policies for Cyber Operation. Event Log Analysis with the LogCluster Tool Today, event logging is a widely accepted concept with a number of event formatting standards and event collection protocols.
Tunnel-based IPv6 transition mechanisms could Maennel Risto Vaarandi. China continues the Authors: Mikk Raud. National Cyber Security Organisation Spain This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in Spain is part of a series which assembles a comprehensive Authors: Alexander Cendoya.
I accidentally malware - what should I do Overcoming inevitable risks of electronic communication The aim of this study is to find mitigation techniques for a number of risks resulting from the usage of Digital media collection by CyCon asked how the traditional Authors: N. Pissanidis H. Veenendaal Eds. National Cyber Security Organisation: United States This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in the United States of America is part of a series National Cyber Security Organisation: Czech Republic This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in the Czech Republic is part of a series which assembles Authors: Anna-Maria Osula.
Economic Aspects of National Cyber Security Strategies Every organisation and government need to know how much is necessary to invest in cybersecurity and how much is enough Anti-Forensic Study The use of anti-forensic techniques in and on IT systems is common practice for advanced and persistent actors, particularly in Insider Threat Detection Study This study focuses on the threat to information security posed by insiders i.
Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine The conflict in Ukraine appears to have all the ingredients for cyber war. Moscow and Kyiv are playing for the highest Authors: Kenneth Geers Ed. National Cyber Security Organisation: Hungary This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in Hungary is part of a series which assembles a comprehensive National Cyber Security Organisation: Lithuania This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in Lithuania is part of a series which assembles a comprehensive Authors: Vytautas Butrimas.
Accessing Extraterritorially Located Data: Options for States Preventing, responding to and investigating cyber incidents relies on time-critical access to relevant data which might be located in countries Authors: Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg.
Mitigating Risks arising from False-Flag and No-Flag Cyber Attacks This report on mitigating risks arising from false-flag and no-flag cyber attacks handles issues related to establishing proper attribution following National Cyber Security Organisation: Slovakia This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in Slovakia is part of a series which assembles a comprehensive National Cyber Security Organisation: Italy This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in Italy is part of a series which assembles a comprehensive Authors: Ludovica Glorioso.
National Cyber Security Organisation: France This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in France is part of a series which assembles a comprehensive Authors: Pascal Brangetto.
James A. Lewis, an internationally recognised expert and a frequent commentator on cyber security matters, Authors: James A. Regulating Cross-Border Dependencies of Critical Information Infrastructure One of the least explored areas of cyber vulnerabilities concerns cross-border dependencies of critical information infrastructure.
The provision of vital Authors: Kadri Kaska Lorena Trinberg. National Cyber Security Organisation: United Kingdom This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in the United Kingdom is part of a series which assembles National Cyber Security Organisation: The Netherlands This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in the Netherlands is part of a series which assembles a Authors: Kadri Kaska. National Cyber Security Organisation: Estonia This publication about the national cyber security organisational setup in Estonia is part of a series which assembles a comprehensive Workshop on Ethics and Policies for Cyber Warfare.
Authors: Corinne J. Cyber Red Teaming. Organisational, technical and legal implications in a military context Cybersecurity is about managing risks and to ascertain that, to a certain extent, proper procedures and adequate security measures are Focus Area: Law Operations Technology.
Technical and Legal Overview of the Tor Anonymity Network In this paper an overview of the Tor anonymisation network is presented from the technical perspective and also several legal Defending mobile devices for high level officials and decision-makers Smartphones are an inevitable presence in everyday life. High-level officials and decision-makers use mobile devices to handle and store sensitive Tallinn Paper: The Law of Cyber Targeting Cyber activities have become an indelible facet of contemporary warfare, not just for cyber-empowered militaries but also for low-tech forces Authors: Michael N.
Authors: Dr Mariarosaria Taddeo. Authors: Dr Sana Saleh. Authors: Dr Jassim Happa. Perfidy in Cyberwarfare Prof Neil C. The workshop was Authors: Prof Neil C. Authors: Dr Patrick Taylor. Authors: Dr Marco Roscini. Authors: Prof Paul Cornish. A meta-level Rule of Law? Authors: Prof Pompeu Casanovas. This makes CII Authors: Bernhards Blumbergs. Locked Shields After Action Report: Executive Summary Locked Shields is a real-time network defence exercise which in involved close to participants from 17 nations.
From Active Cyber Defence to Responsive Cyber Defence: A Way for States to Defend Themselves-Legal Implications This article explores, from a legal perspective, the possibility of states taking responsive measures that enhance their cyber defence capabilities Responsible Attribution: A Prerequisite for Accountability In this new Tallinn Paper, Jeffrey Carr, an internationally recognised author and speaker on cyber conflict, the founder of the Authors: Jeffrey Carr.
Tallinn Paper: The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms This article explores the nature, formation and evolution of international legal norms pertaining to cyber activities.
At present, this category Schmitt Liis Vihul. Using Security Logs for Collecting and Reporting Technical Security Metrics During recent years, establishing proper metrics for measuring system security has received increasing attention. Security logs contain vast amounts of Authors: Mauno Pihelgas Risto Vaarandi. Authors: Liina Areng. Proceedings Content missing. The Liability of Software Manufacturers for Defective Products The most effective and cost-efficient route to cyber security is the development of secure code.
The fewer the vulnerabilities in Authors: Liis Vihul. Authors: Hannes Krause. This chapter identifies the security requirements applicable to classified NATO information. For convenience, it combines references to NATO , found in other chapters of this manual. An employee with a Canadian personnel security clearance does not automatically have access to NATO information. A separate application is required for a NATO personnel security clearance. Non-government employees must have a reliability status for oral or visual access to NATO Restricted information.
NATO Restricted documents may not be released to an unscreened person. They must be handled and safeguarded in keeping with Protected A level information. A Canadian personnel security clearance must be obtained separately. A NATO personnel security clearance for a national of another NATO member nation may only be granted by that parent nation, regardless of the length of time the person has resided in Canada.
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